Abstract-Considering the incentive mechanism of P2P network nodes, this paper analyzes the mechanism combined with the thought of repeated game. First, it respectively describes the modeling conditions and processes for the incentive mechanism of P2P nodes based on the supervision game and the P2P incentive mechanism for identification of node information. Then it performs the simulations for the strategy of two models by software, and the simulation result shows that these two kinds of models are both feasible. Finally, it analyzes and compares the advantages and disadvantages for the two kinds of models, and appropriate scenes for these two models as well.
INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet, Peer-toPeer (P2P) technology is widely used in the network, and every node in the P2P networks lies in the equivalent relationship [1] . Since P2P applications have been into the development of great attention, the problems of trust and security also need more and more attention. Most of the nodes contribute little to the whole network, and only a few nodes support resources for the whole network. Thus in this case, this model has no significant difference with the traditional C/S model, between both of which users lack trust and the resources are not fully used. For example, in the Napster, Gnutella [2] , 66% of the nodes have no contribution to the whole system, 10% of the nodes provide 87% of the document resources, 20% of the nodes provide 98% of the share files. This shows that in P2P networks, there are a lot of selfish nodes, which prone to the following problems that are free-riding problem [3] , the Tragedy of the Commons problem [4] , and the unreliable service and fraud problem. Hence, it is of great necessary to improve the trust and security between network nodes, so as to reflect the advantage of P2P networks to maximize the use of resources advantage.
Currently, according to the phenomenon of many lift and malicious nodes in P2P networks, many scholars at home and abroad put forward different theories for incentive mechanism, which are divided into the following kinds of incentive mechanism that are, virtual pay incentive mechanism [5] , direct mutual incentive mechanism [6] , credit-based incentive mechanism in [7] , and selfless node incentive mechanism [8] . As for current free-riding problem in P2P file systems, the most effective analysis tool is the game theory [9] [10] [11] [12] . Whether P2P network nodes trust each other in fact, is a guessing behavior. That is to say, when thinking the other node is credible, they will interact and it is not, they are not interactive. And this involved interactive behavior is what people in the field economics says, the game [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . How to construct and quantize the incentive mechanism, encourage nodes directly or indirectly to mutual benefit, and promote nodes cooperation is a problem for constant study and discussion. Adopting an effective incentive mechanism will reduce free-riding generally exists in the P2P networks, and realize the steady operations of P2P networks, so as to improve the QoS of P2P network applications. This paper considers the situation of repeated game [21] , in which nodes between each other are not clear how long the game relation between them will last, in other words, the situation whether any two nodes in the P2P networks will continue to exchange information. This paper analyzes the incentive mechanism of P2P network nodes combined with the thought of repeated gaming, respectively describes the modeling conditions and processes for the incentive mechanism of P2P nodes based on the supervision game and the P2P incentive mechanism for identification of node information. This paper also uses related knowledge of the game theory to build the trust model for P2P networks to facilitate the analysis of problem, and make it more visualization through the game analysis model of the Gambit simulation tool.
II. P2P GAME INCENTIVE MODEL

A. The Concept of Repeated Game
Repeated game means that, the same game repeats in a long term and in any stage of the game, it will have a certain income, in which the current and future benefits for the utility of the game participants are different, involving a discount problem. In repeated game, participants determine their own strategy for the next stage, according to the bureau of previous participant game behavior. In game theory, it is known as dependent strategy, and it can be seen as one of trigger strategies, two famous of which are Grim Strategy and Tit for Tat Strategy.
The probability of one game may not be suitable for study, but when the game is repeated, the probability of each strategy can be studied to obtain the biggest average revenues, described by expectation and expected revenue function can be used to compare the pros and cons of the two different mixed strategies.
B. The Incentive Mechanism of P2P nodes based on
Supervision Game P2P network nodes have the characteristics of self organization, making a part of the network nodes appear selfish behavior and P2P network resource sharing not achieve an ideal efficiency. The proposed model combines with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in game, puts forward an incentive mechanism based on the game theory, testing the selfish of network nodes and prompting the nodes consciously join the network.
How to improve self-consciousness of the nodes in the network is what we need to discuss. Based on the game theory of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium to analyze and solve the problems, the purpose of this part is to improve self-consciousness of the nodes in P2P network.
In the game, once each participant tries to guess the strategic choice of the other participants, the optimal behavior is uncertain. Participants don't want to expose their strategic choices to other participants, and randomly choose their own strategies. Mixed strategy is referred as participants of the game choose a strategy at a certain probability. Each strategy will be studied to give what probability to obtain the biggest average revenues, with description as expectations, and expected revenue function can be built to compare the pros and cons of two different mixed strategies.
is a revenue function for participant i . The expected revenue function for participant i can be defined as
The game discussed here aims to improve the selfconsciousness of the P2P network nodes, reduce the existence of the selfish nodes, and play the advantages of P2P network resource sharing, regardless of whether the joining of the nodes will accelerate the transmission of malicious files in the network. In the P2P networks a detection mechanism is built to encourage nodes consciously join the networks and share resources. The strategy that a detection mechanism can choose is detection or not, and the strategy that network nodes can select is voluntary or not. Table I establishes a supervision game, in which the resources that nodes should share is set as , the cost of testing as , the punishment for nodes without self-consciousness to join the network as 
Suppose that the mixed strategy of the detection mechanism is
, that is the probability for the detection mechanism to choose detection, and the probability p p − 1 not to choose detection, and the mixed strategy for the network node is
that is the probability q for the node in the network to join the network without self-consciousness, the probability q − 1 for the node in the network to join the network with self-consciousness. According to Table I and Formula 2, the expected revenue function for the detection mechanism is 
As for hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium , it is equal to solve the optimal problem ) , (
With the method of calculus for extremum, the optimized first-order differential condition is
Thus the mixed strategy of Nash equilibrium for the supervision game is , among which ) , (
As for Formula 7, it is original to solve the optimization problem of detection mechanisms, but the optimal mixed strategy for the given node is gained. And the solution of the optimization strategy for nodes becomes the gaining of optimal mixed strategy for the detection mechanism. Here the explanation is that, the first assumption is the existence of optimal mixed strategy, and the node in the network chooses mixed strategy . The expected revenue function for is (9)
Then from Formula 10 and Formula 11, it can be gained aq a j a Fq − = − + (11) From the analysis above, the shared resource of mixed strategy of Nash equilibrium for supervision game with nodes is , the cost of testing is a j , and the punishment to the nodes joining without self-consciousness is related to F . Assume that j takes a constant value, the more resources that the node should share ( higher), the heavier punishment by the testing mechanism to nodes join the network without self-consciousness ( a F higher), and the smaller possibility for the nodes joining in resource sharing for the network without selfconsciousness, so as to encourage such node consciously join the network for resource sharing. Information Identification P2P network nodes interact with each other and realize the sharing of resources. When a node makes a request to another node, the node will judge the response from another node whether it is trusted or not, so as to make a choice to accept or refuse. The reason is that, these nodes have the incentive to camouflage themselves, say the malicious resources (with a virus or false information) to be reliable resources, so as to gain higher revenue. This model combines the actions of the P2P networks nodes with the thinking of the game theory, explains the best strategy of nodes through the Nash equilibrium, and validates the analysis above using the optimal reaction function.
The action of another node is honest or deceiving, and the action of node is to accept or to refuse. Table II provides games between node actions. 
. According to Nash theorem, there should be a Nash equilibrium for the game. Set the honest probability for another node , the probability q for node to accept .
Given the mixed strategy for node , the expected
revenue of pure strategy for the positive probability of another node of is should be equal, that is
At the time In turn, given the mixed strategy for another node, the expected revenue of pure strategy for the positive probability of node of is should be equal, that is
From the formula above, at that time , , which is obviously impossible to happen. This is because, at that time , which means that if node take the strategy to refuse, its actual payment is more than the payment when adopting the accepting strategy to another node (even node conceives it), hence node has to always accept the suggestion of another node .Thus in this case, the optimal strategy of another node is always deceiving, namely .
, the suggestion of node to refuse another node seeks further help that its expected spending is smaller than always accepting. Hence, the optimal strategy of another node is , that is to say, taking a mixed strategy means honest sometimes, deceiving sometimes, letting a node become unclear to distinguish. In addition, Formula 13 can be rewritten as
From the comprehensive analysis above, at the time , there is only one pure strategy of Nash equilibrium (Deceiving, Accept), at that time , there is only one mixed strategy of Nash equilibrium
, and at that time , under the conditions of another node being cheated, the revenues for node to accept or refuse are the same, and the Nash equilibrium becomes (Deceiving, Accept). Combined with the analysis above, the game simulation software Gambit is used to the model for further analysis, so as to show model more intuitively.
A. Simulation Result for P2P node Incentive Mechanism based on Supervision Game
Here, the detection mechanism is described by test, and P2P networks nodes is described by peer. And as for the detection mechanism, testing strategy is noted as T and non-testing strategy is noted as NT, while as for nodes, conscious strategy is noted as C, unconscious strategy is noted as NC. Then these parameters in the model are adjusted to verify the analysis above.
If j = 5, a = 9, = 20, as shown in Figure 1 , the line represents the self-consciousness of the nodes, and no matter the inspection policy for detection mechanism is taken or not, the self-consciousness of nodes are very high. Figure 1 . Self-consciousness of nodes by initial hypothesis Keep j = 5 and a = 9, and reduce the punishment , and set F = 5. Then the self-consciousness of the nodes declines rapidly, and the detection mechanism plays no role. As shown in figure 2, the curve below represents self-consciousness of the nodes.
F
Keep j = 5 and F = 20, reduce the resources a by nodes to consciously contribute, and set a = 2. Then selfconsciousness of nodes sharing resources declines. As shown in figure 3, the curve above represents selfconsciousness of nodes, which indicates that the greater resources share, more self-conscious nodes become and more afraid nodes become about being detected that it dose not join the network. 
B. Simulation Results for P2P Game Incentive Mechanism of Node Information Identification
The analysis above shows that, when is, the more other nodes are worthy to cheat, then the higher probability of to accept the suggestions to cheat another node .And the honest probability for 
, and regulate the values to observe the changes of output graphics.
, the results are shown in Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively, where the curve above presents the tendency of . As indicated in Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure 6 , different values of x′ play influence on the game of nodes, which are that, the closer x and ′ x , the closer node cooperation, and when (as shown in Figure 4 ), the greater the probability of , the more likely to accept . In this way, the results of the analysis above have been verified that the greater the ratio 1 . 
C. Comparison Analysis of Two Incentive Mechanisms
According to the uncertainty of the analysis of the nodes in P2P network, P2P node trust model for identification of node information combines the way of resource sharing between nodes with the thinking of the game theory, and establishes a game model between nodes.
Using the supervision game, the incentive model for P2P nodes is mainly based on the hypothesis that a testing system exists in P2P networks. This testing system detects if the nodes consciously join the network, punishes the network nodes consciously not to join, thereby encouraging network nodes fear for the punishment and consciously involving in the network. These two incentive mechanisms are generated under some given conditions, and in particular conditions, the use of these P2P game trust model can effectively solve the problem of self-consciousness in the P2P network nodes, and establish a good P2P network environment. P2P trust game model can really effectively promote the security and stability of P2P networks, make the network nodes consciously added to the P2P networks, reduce the possibility of the node taking malicious attack behaviors, greatly guarantee the interests of P2P network users not violated, well improve the overall performance of the P2P networks, and promote the healthy development of P2P networks. Table III provides comparison analysis of these two incentive mechanisms. 
Disadvantages
No studies on how to join the detection mechanisms in networks
Limitation of the rigid assumptions, without enough flexibility IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK This paper analyzes the incentive mechanism of P2P network nodes combined with the thought of repeated game, respectively describes the modeling conditions and processes for the incentive mechanism of P2P nodes based on the supervision game and the P2P incentive mechanism for identification of node information, and performs the simulations for the strategy of two models by software with the simulation result that these two kinds of models are both feasible. But there are strengths and weaknesses for both models, with concrete research results as follows. How to improve the consciousness of P2P nodes by using mixed strategy of Nash equilibrium are discussed for incentive mechanisms for P2P nodes based on supervision game, in order to avoid the existence of selfish nodes. In a network, a detection mechanism is established to test the nodes in P2P networks in an un-regular way, and urge selfconsciousness of the network nodes for sharing resources. The analysis result shows that, in the conditions of certain testing cost, the more resources should be shared by nodes (bigger a ), the heavier punishment for the testing mechanism to join the network without consciousness (bigger F ), the smaller probability for the nodes in the network without consciousness to join network shared resources.
* q
In the following work, the types of nodes will be discussed, in order to improve the sharing of resources and avoid the spread of some malicious files.
